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ABSlRACT 
We extend the classical Cournot model to take account of 
uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function. By 
undertaking research, firms can acquire private (asymmetric) 
information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed 
production decision. Die model is a two stage game: in the first 
stage research levels are chosen, and in the second stage, conditional 
on private research outcomes, production decisions are made. 
We find that for a linear, continuous information structure there 
is a unique Nash equilibrium to the game. In the equilibrium there may 
be an inef ficient amount of aggregate research and there may be 
incomplete pooling as well. 
lhe model specializes to the classical case when the cost of 
research is zero (and each firm gains essentially the same information 
by doing an infinite amount of reseach) or when the cost of research is 
so high no firm undertakes research. 
OPTIMAL RESEARCH FOR COURNOT OLIGOPOLISTS 
1. Introduction 
We study an oligopolistic indUBtry in which there is 
u.�certainty either in the cost function or the demand function. By
undertaking re:iearch prior to their production decision. fi.rms can 
acquire private information which may help them resolve the 
uncertainty and make a more informed decision on the level of 
production. We characterize equilibri\UD behavior that will emerge in 
such a model. where :t'irms f"irst choose a research level and then 
choose a level of production based on their private data. We then 
compare the behavior of the oligopoly with an efficiency standard. 
where the amount of research and the total output maximizes net 
expected social benefits-expected consumer plUB producer surplus. 
Our model is an extell31on of the classical mod.el of an 
oligopoly. and specialize:i to the classical mod.el in two ways. First. 
as the cost of research increases. the amount of research declines. 
When the cost of research is suffi.ciently high. :t'irms undertake no 
research and the model speci.alizes to the classical model of an 
oligopoly without research. Second. if the cost or research decreases 
to zero. each firm does an infinite amount of research. Each firm 
obtain::s essentially the same information. and the model again 
specializes to the classical one. 
Sane of our results do not depend upon the cost of research 
and are the same as in the classical oligopoly model. We find. for 
example. that as the number of' firms increases. the total expected. 
equilibrium. output increases monotonically and converges to the 
expected efficient output. 
However, in the extension, when the cost of research is 
pasi ti ve (to prevent infinite research) and low enough to permit saue 
research, we t'ind new and contrasting results. First, the total 
amount of research undertaken by the oligopoly can be e1 ther less or 
more than the ef ficient amount of research-more if' the cost of 
research is low and less if' the cost of research is high. Second, we 
find incomplete pooling of information. And t�d, as a consequence 
of these sources of 1nef1"1ciency, we fi.nd that the expected net 
bene!'its in the oligopoly equilibrium of n firms converge as n 
increases. to a level below the expected benet"its of the efficiency 
standard. 
Our model is similar to those of' Clarke [1984]. Gal-Dr [1984] 
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and Novshek and Sonnenschein [1982] in the second stage game of output 
decisions given private signals. More explicitly, in all these 
papers, firms face a linear uncertain demand, and each observes a 
private signal for the state ot the demand. These papers then address 
questions of incentives for information sharing. There are two 
princi.pal dif ferences between this paper and the one.s cited. First. 
we focu.s on research incentives when information is co.stly and there 
is no sharing. (In a model w1 th a normal information structure Gal-Or 
[1983) shows there are incentives not to share for the case we 
address. Li [1985) extends the:se results to a linear information 
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structure, and n firms and also 8hows that any int'ormation aharing is 
not an equilibrium.) Second, our information structure is more general 
and includes a wide class of conjugate pairs which satisfy certain 
linearity conditions. 
2. � !!2l!tl
Consider an industry with n identical firms, facing a 
stochastic inverse demand runction of the form. n-1(Q,9), where 
Q = bi qi is the total quantity produced, and e is the true state of 
the world. Each fi:rm has an identical cost function, C(qi,ti), which 
is a function of its own production, qi, and of the amount ot 
research, ti, that it undertakes. Both D
-1 and C are linear, so that 
D-1co.e> = a0 + ae - bQ 
with a0,b > o, and 
C(qi,til = co + "iqi + cti 
with c,c0,c1 > o. While we assume the uncertainty arises in the 
intercept of the demand function, the analysis is identical if the 
uncertainty arises from the coeffici.ent c1 in the cost t'unction. 
Also, while we assume the cost function is linear in ti, our results 
could be extended to deal with the case when cost is convex in ti. 
Given choices q c Cq1, • • •  ,q0) and t = Ct1, • • •  ,t0), by the n 
firms, the profit of firm i is then of the form 
-1 \ •i(t,q.9) = qiD (L.. qi,9) - C(qi.ti) 
n 
= qi CA + ae - b ) q jl - c0 - cti .J=1 
(2.1) 
where a0 - c1 = A 
The model is a two stage game. whose extens1 ve form is drawn 
in Figure 1. In the f'1rst stage. the true value of e is generated. 
then f'irms have a simultaneous move in which they select research 
levels t • Ct1 ••••• t0). In the second stage. (conditional on the 
research choice). there is first a chance move that generates the 
private data. y ... Cy1 ••••• y0) for each firm. Each firm observes the 
research levels selected by each f'irm. but only observes its mm 
private data. The fi.rms then have a simultaneous move in which each 
firm determines its output level. Thus a strategy tor firm i in the 
second stage is a function qi (y i) which specifies an output for each 
pcssible observed value. yi. of the private signal. 
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The equilibrium definition we use is that of a subgame perf'ect 
Nash Equilibrium. Thus. we proceed by solving the second stag� f'irst. 
for any given t = Ct1 •. ••• tn). The first stage is then solved by 
assuming that payoff's from the first stage are determined by 
equilibrium behavior in the second stage. 
To solve the second stage. we note that this game is in the 
form of' a game of' incomplete information. where firm types are 
determined by their private information. Yi. Thus.. the appropriate 
equilibrium is that of Bayesian Nash (see. e.g ... Barsanyi (1967-8]). 
Here we find there is a unique linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Assuming that firms adopt this equilibrium in the second stage. it 
follows that in the first stage. and hence to the overall game,. there 
is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
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In order to complete the description of the extensive form. we 
must .specify the probability distributions f'or the chance moves. We 
assume that e is generated according to a distribution g(e). and then 
that y1 is generated according to b(y11e.t1>. where 
1 ti : E[varCy1 le>1 
• (2.2) 
ThU3. the research level of each firm is a measure of the expected 
precision of the data it is to receive. The higher its research 
level. ti. the lower the expected variance of' its data. Both g(*) and 
h(·(.e.t
i) are assumed to have f'inite variances. Also. for any tixed 
ti.tj 
and&. the conditional distribution of' yi. given ti and&. is 
assumed independent of' yj. given tj 
and&. These probability 
distributions are common knowledge. Hence. g(&) is the common prior 
distribution (before they see any data) that tirms have for &. Each 
f'irm only sees its own data. yi" and on the basis of this. can compute 
a posterior fC&ly1 .. ti> for e. 
We make the following assumptions about the information 
structure. For all t = Ct1 ...... tn) 
Al: E<y1 le> = e 
A2: E(9ly1) = Yi + &iyi 
for some y1,.61 a JR. Bence. the firm"s signal is an unbiased 
estimator of& .. and the expectation of' e given y1 is linear in y1• 
Under assumptions Al and A2 .. it follows .. from a result of Ericson 
[1968]. that 
I I 
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Figure 1 
Extensive �·orm of Game 
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+chance 
(pick 0) 
+player 1 "' ... 
(pick ti) > " 
"' 
t1•l .... 
+player 2 
t� "-•··l (pick t2) 
I I 
I 
A +chance � 
(pick yi) 
+chance I"' (pick y2 ) � 
"" 
"' 
+player 1 
(pick qi) 
+player 2 
(pick q,) 
& var<e> var<§> i = var(9) + E[var(yil9ll 
= var(yi) '
and, writiog 90 = E(9) ,
Yi = ( 1  - 6iJ90• 
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(2.3) 
(2.4) 
Substitutiog (2.2) in (2.3 ) .  and writiog R = �· for tbe precision 
of the prior, we get an expression for CAZ) in terms of t1: 
with 
ECelyi) = _lL_ e + i_ ti + R 0 t + R Yi' i 
ti 61 = t1 + R* 
(2.S) 
(2.6) 
Since R is the precision of' the prior, and t1 is a measure of the 
expected precision of the data .. this aays that the posterior estimate 
of e is a convex combination of the prior mean and the observed data. 
Each is weighted in proportion to its measure of precision. Also, 
usiog (A1) and (A2), we get 
E(yj(yi) = EC9(yi) = yi + 6iyi'
cov(y1,yj) = cov(yi.e) •var e.
R + t 
var ( y ) = .Yl!1:..§ = =----:.1 i 6i Rti 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
Before proceeding. we give several. examples of information 
structures that satisfy our conditions. See e.g •• Degroot (1970]. 
Example 1: Let the prior of e be given by gCe) - Beta( a..f!;) and the 
data be described by hCy119.ti) - n
l 
Bin( ni. e> where Bin ( Di.e> is a i 
binomial distribution with parameters n1 and e, and where 
n1 = t1 Ca +IS) var(§) = t1
C g ; s>. Then the posterior or & is 
f(9(yi.ti) - Beta(a+niyi. �+ni-niyi) ' and 
E(9(yi) = 
a + Y1n1 -
a. + B __..e_ 
a + IS + n1 ci + IS + n1 
C a + is> 
W'here 
= (1 - 6)90 + 6iyi 
n t 
6 = - �1 a + IS + n1 R + t1 
ni + a + IS + n1 
71 
Rn 
In this example, t1 = � is a function of the number of 
observations. 
Example z_, Let tbe prior of 9 be given by g(9) - N C 90,a�) and 
8 
h(yi
(e,ti> - NCe,; ) ,  where N('9,.<J2 ) is a normal distribution with mean i 
9, and variance (J2• So R = �, 
0 
and 
R9o + tiyi ei = R + ti ' 
...!.. = R + ti. 2 ai 
Hence. 
and f(9(yi,ti ) - N C ei.ai> where 
EC9(y1) = e1 = (1 - 6i) 90 + 6iyi . 
where 
t 
6 - __.::.L_ i - R + t • i 
In this example. we can let yi be a sample of n1 independent 
2 ni observations from N(-9.cr). 1n which case t1=2• or we could let y1
a 
be a sample of a fixed number of' observations from N(-G,.a(t1>2> .. in
which case t1 = �·
aCt1) 
Example 1: Let the prior 01' e be given by g(6) - rca,p) and the data 
be described by h(y1(e.t1) --;;:PCn1e) Where rca,p) is a Gamma 
d1str1but1on, with parameters u,. JS, where P(l.) is a Poisson with 
at 
parameter l... and where n1 = =j-1. Then the posterior of & has 
rcely1.t1> -r<a+n1yi.p+°i>· So 
E(6(yi) 
where 
.. + niyi = ___IL_ r�1 = fS+ni fS+n11$ 
= <1 - 6i>eo + 6iyi
_:L=� 61 = P + ni a: 
=__i_
CL + ti 
R + t i 
+--1... p + n Yi:i 
In this example, ti = !iii is a !'unction of the number of observations 
We emphas1ze that since our i.ntormation :structure need not be 
normal, this leaves some freedom to model the uncertainty in ways 
which constrain the set of possible states e to be reasonable for the 
specif'ic problem. For example the Gamma-Poisson 1s reasonable if one 
wishes to imPose nonnegativity constraints on & (to keep the intercept 
of the demand function positive}. On the other band. if one views the 
uncertainty a.s arising from the cost function. then it is sometimes 
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usef'ul to let the parameter. e. represent the probability of an event. 
(See, e.g., McKelvey and Page [1985] who model an industry producing 
potentially toxic chemicals in such a fashion). In this case the 
Beta-Binomial is an obvious choice. Ericson [1968] points out several 
other distributions satisfying the linearity assumption. 
3. The��� 
In this section. we f'i.x t = (t1, • • • •  t0), and derive the 
Bayesian equilibrium strategy functions qi= qi(yi).
Proposition 1 For any f'ixed t = (ti •••• ,tn)• there is a unique
Bayesian equilibrium to the second stage game. The equilibrium
strategy for each player is linear in his information.
l.r.2.Ql: For any n tuple of strategies. q • (q1 ••••• qn) 
= Cq1 Cy1). • • •  ,qn(yn)). we can write the expected prof'it for firm i as 
ECn1IY1> = E(ni(t,q.e)(yi) = qi(A - bqi - b;;iE(qJ(yi)
+ aECelyi>> - c0 - cti.
Any equilibrium paint must satisfy the first order conditions: 
2q1 = � + Cy1 + 61y1)� - );1E(qJ(y1> ror all 1.
This can be rewritten as 
2[q1 - (ai + piyi>] = � + (yi + 61Y1>� - j;/CqJ(yi)
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
-2ai - 2piyi. 
where we define a1 and p1 by 
and 
p = � 
6 t [ l. Ji b + l. • where l.i m ---=.L_ = ---..::1 j 2 - 6 t + 2R' i i 
2Re0p1 ___l__ �a'i = (1 + n)b+ t1 - 1 + n � tj · 
Note that pi;.j = pj;.1• so, from (3.4), we have 
� ;.i = Pi + �pi;.J = P1 + ;.i�pJ. 
Hence. usiog � -� 
l.1+1 2
,,we get 
Pi= �[-�/J + �] · 
Further. from (3.5). 
) aj • -"- ! + __ 2_ LR9gPJ ':r n+l b n+l tj 
Solving for a1 in terms of �1 aj
" and adding to (3.S). we get 
a = ![! - � 2 R90Pi] 1 2 b aj + i ti 
• 
Substitutiog (3.7) and then (3.6) in (3.3), we get 
2[q1 - Cai+ p iyi>] = (yi + 6iyi)� - �/Cqjlyi) 
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(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
� 
Y1 
+ aJ - 2pic5 + Y1> 1 1 
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= -�
i
E(qjlyi) + �i
aj + �
i
pj(yi + 6iyi) 
= -�
i
E(qj - (aj + p jyj)lyi). (3.8) 
Writiog Vj(y) = qj - (aj + pjyj), it follows from (3.8) that each i's 
Bayesian strategy must :satisi"y,, for any y1,, 
Vi(yi) = - �E[Vj(yj)(yi] 
Multiplyiog (3.9) by Vi (yi). and tald.og expectations, 
ECV1Cyil
21 = - �E[Vi(yi)E[Vj(yj)(yi]] = - �E[Vi(yi)Vj(yj)]. 
summing over all 1. we get
) E[ViCy1) I = - ) E[Vi(yi)Vj(yj)] 
n 2 n t
:t.=1 �1 ml 
(3.9) 
we get 
Then 
(3.10) 
But E[v1cy1)Vj(yj)] is just the variance covariance matrix of
the random vector V(y) = CV1(y1), v2cy2J, • • •  ,Vn(yn)), hence is
Positive semi definite. So (3.10) implies E[Vi(yi)
2J = O. and hence 
v1cy1> = O almost zsurely,, i.e.,, q1.., a+ p1y1 almost surely. 
Q.E.D. 
We next derive the expected total output at the Bayesian Nash 
Equ ilibrium. 
Proposition .2, For any fixed research levels,. t • Ct1 ....... tn) tbe 
expected total output at the Bayesi.an equilibrium is 
E(�
l
qi) • (n + l)b (A+ aeo> · 
h:99f: For any given e. if qi • qi (yi) i• the Bayeoian atrategy, 
So 
E!qileJ • "i + PiE<yile> • "i +pie
. 
E!qi] • "i + pieO 
A 2R9oPi 2 R9oP 1 
<n + l)b + ti - n+1 � tJ + P i9o 
A__ - -1...._ :i PiR90P1 + � (n + l)b n + l�l.i ti ;.i 
-__ P&i __ - + (n + l)b (n + l)l.i 
[ 
ReoP 1"1 l -2[ tJ + <n + 1>e0 
A pi ) = (n + l)b + (n + l)l.i!
l + ':r "J l 9o 
A__ !I � 
Cn + l)b + b (n + 1) 
13 
1 
(n + l)b (A+ aeo>
· (3.1 1) 
So 
E[J:iqJ] • (n + l)b (A+ aeo>· 
4. IM fiW � J1iU 
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(3.12) 
Q.E.D. 
In this secti.on. we character1ze the Hash equilibrium. to the 
full game. Thus .. we allow t .. Ct1 ....... tn) to vary .. and search for a 
Nash equ ilibrium in t given that Bayesian strategies,. q1 llC q1 Cy1) (as 
described in Proposition 1) .. are adopted in the second stage game. 
For any f'ixed re:i.earch levels,. t = Ct1,. . • •  ,. t0) it' .tirm 
1 rollows its 
Bayesian equilibrium strategy. then substituting (3.2) into (3.1),. we 
find its expected profit conditioned on y1,. is 
2 E(nilyi) = bqi - Co - cti. (4.1) 
We write firm i's expected profit a:s a f'unction or the research level,. 
tj. a3 ni (t). Then. 
Ili<t> = E(ni(t.q,e)) • E(E(ni(t,q.e>lyi)) 
• bE[E(qilyi)] - c0 - cti 
= bE(q�) - c0 - cti. 
But 
E(qi) • [E(qi)]2 + var(qi) 
So. uoing (3.11). and (2.9). 
2 2 [E(qi)J +Pi var(yi). 
Ili(t) 
where 
Di(t) 
2 
-1 - CA + ae J2 + L D (t) - c - ct b(n + l)2 o b i o i 
b2�2 ..:..::.1. 
a26 R i 
ti!_ti + RJ 
2 ) t i )2 RC ti + 2R) Cl + 'J ti + 2R 
15 
(4.2) 
( 4.3) 
Thus. II i (t) is the payorf !'Unction for the first stage game. 
given Bayesian strategies are f'ollowed in the second stage. Our ma.in 
resu.J. ts establish existence and properties of the eq,uili.brium for this 
game. We consider two ca.ses, depending on what constraints are placed 
on the strategy .space. The most natural choice ror the strategy space 
is to let player i's strategy space be E +• where JR + is: the non 
Degative reals. Then a choice of ti s JR+ simply selects a signal of 
a given expected precision. ti. However .some of the information 
structures {such a:s those in Examples 1 and 3 of Section 2) restrict 
the precision of the :llgnal, since the precision is only a function of 
the signal through the number of observations. Bence 1 t is: also of 
interest to consider the case when player 1 's strategy space is S, 
where S is a set {possibly infinite) of isolated points of :fl: +· We 
then define the two games 
r • < II .JR n > 
+ 
r· • < II .sn > 
and refer to them, respectively as the continuous and discrete 
research games. 
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Proposition 1,.. For the continuous research game, f, 
(a) There ia a unique Nash equ111br1um .. t ... <t1 • • • • •  t0) which is 
symmetric (i.e. ti= tj for all i.
j) .  
(b) The equilibrium., t1• is a continuous. decreasing, and convex 
function of c and b; a continuous. increasing function of a; a 
continuous decreasing t'unotion of' R. and a decreasing t'unction of 
n. 
Proposition i• For the discrete research game, r•, 
(a) There is a unique symmetric equ1l1br1um in mixed strategies. 
(b) The expected research at the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium 
is a continuous decreasing funct1on of' c. b, and R. and a 
continuous increasing function of a. 
(c) Let s•1 and s"1 be the smallest and largest elements of' S Vi.th 
Positive support in the symmetric mixed. strategy equilibrium. for 
player i. and let ti be the Nash equilibrium. :for player i in the 
corresPonding continuous game r {with the same parameters, a, ao· 
n. etc.). Then 
1i ! s•i ! s"i ! ti 
where !i is the greatest element of S less than or equal to ti. 
and t1 is the smallest element of S greater than or equal to ti .. 
states 
Propositions 3 and 4 follow from a more general lemma which 
conditions for monotonicity of the reaction !unctions and the 
existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium.. The lemma (Lemma 1 J and 
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its application are in the appendix .. 
Propositions 3 and 4 completely characterize the equilibrium 
of the continuous re.search game and approxi.mately character:l.ze that of 
the discrete game. From C A.2) the equilibrium t1 for the continuous 
game can be easily calculated for any parameters .. Proposition 4 says 
that the symmetric equilibrium for the discrete reaearch game will be 
close to the equilibrium in the corresponding continuous game. in the 
sense that the aupport ot the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium 
consists of at most 2 adjacent elements of s. which are "straddled" by 
the best approxillations in S to the equilibrium ot the corresponding 
continuous game. It follows :from (c) that if the continuous game has 
an equilibriWll which happens to be in s .. then the equilibrium or the 
discrete game will coincide with it. In the discrete research game 
there can be additioll8.l Mymmetric equilibria (due to the discrete 
nature of the game); however. in what follows we will focus on the 
symmetric equilibrium which is approximated by the unique equilibrium 
or the continuous game. 
We next consider the competitive aituation. by letting the 
number or firms get large. We write t� for the equilibrium research 
f n n for firm i in an n firm oligopoly. and In = bi ti = nti. Then write 
and 
n tcm lim ti i n-
Tc = limT n-n 
for the competitive 1.ndivi.dual and total research. 
Pz:oP2sition 1: In the continuous research game. T. 
2 
(a) For O < c < �· 
tc = i 
T = c 
2 
o. 
[ 211/2 � - 2R. 
(bl For ---"::;: � c, t� = Tc - O 4blf" 
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h:Q.91: In the continuous game. when n increases the equilibrium total 
T = [ti = nti approaches, by (A.S) and (A.8), as a f'unction of c2, 
the envelope 
_J--:-m� 
CT + 2Rl2 a2 
By substituting t = O 1n (A.8)* we see that* for any n. 
the equilibrium T is zero in either game. 
5.. Efficiency 
(4.4) 
2 
when c 2. ....L._ 
•br
· 
C2.E.D. 
In this section. we solve for the research and output which 
would result 1.f a "center" attempted to 11axim1.Ze soci.al welfare 
(consumer plus producer surplus). We then compare the oligopoly 
solution to this efficiency standard. We assume that tor any given 
research. T. undertaken by the center. it obtains a a:Lgnal.. Y. having 
the same properties as those of the firms (in (Al) and (A2)). Namely 
RO +TY 
ECYIO> = 0 and ECOIY) = _o __ 
19 
(5.1) 
where T is the expected precision or the data obta:lned by the center. 
To avoid problems of multiple equilibria and non-
differentiability .. we assume throughout this section a continuous 
information structure. For this continuous case we find that if 
equilibrium oligopoly research T0 is positive but finite, the expected 
net benefits in the oligopoly equilibrium are less than those or the 
et't"iciency standard.. even for the limiting competitive case .. when 
n -7 w. 
To characterize the sources of ineffid.ency we introduce an 
intermediate game where information i:s pooled, and deri.ve conditio?l$ 
where in the ef'N.ciencies arise. The intermediate game 1.s an 
artif'icial situation in which ti.rm:s ded.de on research levels 
t = Ct1 ••••• tn} as in the oligopoly game. but then. after having done 
the research. the results of research output of' all firms 1.s pooled by 
the "center". and made publicly available (as common knowledge} to 
each of the n firms. The f'irms do not know that the information will 
be pcoled when they make the research decision. Once the research is 
pcoled. since each f'irm has the zsame information. the :second stage of' 
this game is es:sentially the same as the classical oligopoly game. 
To ensure that the aggregate 1.nformation has the same content 
whether it is gathered on a decentralized basis and then pooled,. or 
gathered on a centralized basis. we introduce an additional 
assumption. We assume that f'or any t = Ct1 ...... tn}• and 
y::: (y1•···•Yn)• 
A3' ECOly) is af'i'ine in y 
20 
This assumption (together with Al) can be shown to imply assumption 
AZ. It also i'o11ows (see Li [1985] l that for T = [ti. the aggregate 
- [ tiyi signal. Y ... _ is a sufficient statistic of y Wi.th 
T 
RO + T Y  
ECYIOl • o and ECOIY> • __,o'--_ 
R+T 
We def'ine the consumer pl\13 producer 8urplus ("social 
benefits'' for short) for T, Q, and '8 by 
W = !D-l(Q.O)dQ - C(Q,T) 
• AQ + aQO - � - c0 - c2T 
So 
ECWIY.Tl = AQ + aQECOIYl - �2 - c0 - c2T 
(5.2) 
( 5.3) 
( 5.4) 
and f'or fixed T the efficient output Qe which max1m1zes (S.4} over Q 
is given by the first order condition 
Qe = Qe(Y) = tcA + aECOIYll ( 5 . 5 )  
Define q� a s  the equilibrium output for f'irm i in the 
continuous game of Section 4 .. and total output Qn"" f q�. Def'ine q� /;;1 
as the equllibrium output for f'irm i in the intermediate. pooled 
information game. and total output a: = [ q�. We now Bhow that 
[ R00 + TY] Qe = Qe CYl = t A + a R + T (5.6) 
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-D P n [ R9o + Tn:J l.l"n = Qn(Y) = (n + l)b A+ a: R + Tn � cs. 7) ( 2nRe0 + (n + l)Tn::J Qn = Qn(Y) = �(n---'+"-l�l� b A+" 2nR + (n + llTn l (5.8) 
Equation (5.6l follows fran applying ( 5 . 1) to (5.5) . To 
establi:sh (5.7) we write down the f'irst order conditions corresponding 
to (3.2l 
2qP • ! + JI E(9i!) - ) qP i b b 
51 j 
So q� • q�. 
�(Yl = (n + Ub (1 + aE(91Yl) 
and applying (S.2l With T = Tn being the equilibrium research, 
equation (S.7) follows directly. 
To establish (5.8) note that in the unique oligopoly 
equilibrium of the continuous case t1 ... tj .. and we can write t1 = t .. 
a1 = c:i .. �1 c: � .. T0 .. nt .. nY = [y1 .. and Q0 = nq�. By Proposition 1 
00 = na + �[y1 a: na + n�Y. 
___L_ 
= A 2R+t .A [ � bl+-'!L... b 2nR+ 2R + t 
L- 2R90� 
Tn J 
(n + ll TJ 
2aRne0Tn a • + • + Cn + llb Cn + llt Cn + llb Cn + l)bT0(2nR + Cn + llTn> 
[ 2nR90 + (n + llT0:J Qn = na. + n�Y "' {n + l)b A+ a 21'.lR + {n + l)Tn j 
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From (5.3) the expected social benefit• for Q • Q(Yl and T is 
W(T) • E[E[WIQ,TJ] • AECQ) + aE(Qe) - �Ecif> - c0 - c2T 
• AECQ) + a[90ECQ) + cov(Q,9)] - -2[ (E(Q)) 
2 + var Q] 2 
- c0 - cT 
= (A+ a90 - �E(Q))E(Ql +a cov(Q,9) 
b - zvar<Ql - c0 - cT 
To derive the ef'N.cient level of research.. note first 
ECQ l • l.<A + a9ol e b 
2 T [ aTY ] • -::-'�-var(Qe) = var b(R + Tl b2RCR + Tl 
cov(Qe,9l • b(Ra! Tl cov(Y.9) • b(R
aI T) var(9l • � T) 
(S.9). 
Thus for any given T. the expected soci.al benef'its t'raa the optillal Q e 
are 
1 2 a2T We(Tl • 2ii(A + a9ol + 2bR(R + Tl - co - cT 
(5.lOl 
The eff'icient research is the research .. Te• satisfying the first order 
conditions 
30 
L--.�for O<c - 2 2(T + Rl2 a 
2 
< .JI.._ 
2R2b' 
and T • o for 
� 2 l /2 
T = _a_ e be - R tor O < c <_L 2R2b 
The second order condition yield3 
2 
aar2We<Tl 
2 
JI__< 0 2 b(T + R) 
2 
c l .JI.._ 
2a2b 
( 5 . 11) 
(S.12l 
( 5 . 13 l 
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To der1ve the expected social benef'its in the pooled 
inf orm.ation game> note 
E(Q�) = en+ l)bCA + a90> 
n2a2T 
var(QP) = ------''---n (n + 1)2ii2RCR + T ) 
( 5. 14) 
n 
COV(�,9) 
naTn 
bR(R + Tn) 
So the expectation of' W in the pooled information equ111brium is 
2 
wP(T ) = n n 
(n + 2)n 
(n + 1)2b 
2 (n + 2)na T0 (A + a90) + 2 - Co - cTD (n + 1) bR(R + Tn) 
(5.15) 
To derive the expected social benet'its for the oligopoly game. 
note from ( 5.6) 
E(Qn) • (n + l)b CA + a9ol 
2 2 Tn(R + Tn) var Q :o 1l....!L --�--� n b2 R(2nR + (n + l)Tnl
2 
.!!& TD cov(�.9) = b R(2nR + (n + l)Tn) 
( 5.16) 
So the expectation of' W in this oligopoly game. for equ1librium T0 is 
2 
W (T ) = n(n + 2) (A + a9 )2 + _
a_nT_, n._<_< _n_+_ 2_lT,, n�+-3_nR
"7"
) 
n n 2(n + ll2b O 2bRC<n + l)T + 2nRl
2 
n 
-c0 - cTn (5.17) 
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To identify three sources of inefficiency we derive the main 
welf'are result (propC>Sition 9) in terms of the f'ollOW'ing lemma. 
�1-
(i) W0CT0J - W0CTnl > o for Tn � T0• 
(ii) W0(Tn) - W�(Tn) > o. for n 2. 1 and Tn}. O, and the difference 
converges to zero as n -:) ...  
(iii) W�(Tn) - W�(Tn) > o. for n 2. 2 and Tn > O and the difference 
does not converge to zero except when T0 = O or T0 -:) •. 
.fr:.22!:. (1) From the def'1nit1on of' T and the second ord�r condition e• 
( 5 . 13 ) ,  (i) is ObviOWI. 
(ii) From (5.10) and ( 5.15) 
We (Tn) - W�(Tn) 
CA + a90J2 aT 
+ 
2(n + 1)2b 2(n + 1J2bR(Tn + R) 
> o. 
(iii) From ( 5.15) and ( 5 . 17) . 
W�(Tn) - Wn(Tn) 
n(n - l)a2T0(n(n + 3)R + l(n + l)T0) 
= > o. 
2(n + ll2bCR + T )(2nR + (n + l)T >2 n n 
for n l 2 and T0 > O. 
Asymptotic properties can be seen by examining the above differences. 
Prooostion §.. 
(a) If 0 < c 
Q.E.D. 
In the continuoUB game 
a2 < --:2". the expected social benefits in the oligopaly 
2Jrb 
equilibrium converge 8.3 n increases. to a limit below the 
(b) If c 
efficient level. 
.2 
l -- 13 
2R2b 
fixed and n-) CD,. or if coo7 O and n"' • .. the 
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expected social benefita in the oligopaly equilibrium converge to 
the efficient level. 
h:QQf. 
We(Te) - Wn(Tn) • [We(Te) - We(Tnll + [We(Tn) - W�(Tn)] 
+ [WP(T ) - W CT )] n n n n 
where we know fran Lanma 2 that each or the bracketed terms is non­
negative .. 
case (a). If'O<c L < _, • by Proposition S as n-) •.. Tn 4Jrb 
converges to Tc• where O < Tc < •. By Laama 2(111). [W�(Tn) - Wn(Tn)] 
does not converge to zero and hence [We(Te> - Wn(Tn)] does not 
2 2 
converge to zero. If � s_ cs_ �· by Proposition 5, equilibrium 
4Jrb 2Jrb 
research is zero for all n. By (S.11) Te > O.. Hence by Lemma 2(1). 
[We(Te> - We<Tc>l > O and [We(Te> - Wn(Tn)J does not converge to zero. 
a2 Case (b). If c l -::;-. then T = T = 0. By LEmma 2(i) 
W.CTe) - We(Tn) 
by Lemma 2(ii). 
2Irb n e 
= O and by LEmma 2(iii), W�(Tn) - Wn(Tn) = 0. Since. 
for any Tn• we CT0) - w:cTn) converges to zero. 
We(Te> - w:<Tn) converges to zero.. If c-? 0 and n-? •. a .similar 
argument applies. 
Q.E.D. 
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In case (b) each firm has essentially the 88lle intormation and 
the resulting efficiency is tbe same as 1n the classical model. The 
extension of the classical mod.el is in case (a) .. where there is (with 
Positive probability) asymmetric private information and resulting 
inefficiency. Lemma 2 traces three sources of inet'f'iciency. 
The term [W8CT8) - W8(T0)] represents a research 1.nef'ficiency 
which arises when oligopoly equilibr1um re�arch Tn does not equal the 
eff'ici.ent Te. Tbe term [We(Tn) - W�(Tn)J represents the cla.soical 
oligopoly inefficiency which ari:ses tTan 8trateg1c expl01 ta ti on of the 
demand curve and goes away as n becomes large.. The term 
[Wp(T0) - w:CT0) l represents (as we will later discuss) an inett'icency 
from incomplete pooling.. It is especially noteworthy that the 
research inefficiency and the incomplete pooling 1nerriciency do not 
vanish when n gets large. 
The following proposition states when the research 
1neff1c1ency arises (when Tn P Te>· 
Prooosition l· In the continuous oligopoly game. for each n .l 2. 
there is a positive constant kn such that 
(a) if' O < c < kn. then T0 > Te 
(b) 1t' c = k0• then T0 ... Te 
2 
Cc> 1f' k < c < ...ii-, then T < T • n 2bR2 n e  
Moreover. in the monopoly case. n = 1. if O > c 
And for all n, if 
2 
c �..a_ 
2bR2
' then T0 = Te = 0 .. 
>..L 
2ba2
' then T1 < Te. 
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.!X.2.2!: (in appendix). 
The efficient Te is plotted as a function of c in Figure 
2. 
The equ1.l1bril.lll1 Tn for the continuous game is al.so plotted for n "" 
1.2.3.4.S_,. and for the competitive envelope ot Proposition s. 
Proposition 7 makes it easy to construct examples where there is a 
unique equilibrium to the discrete r83earch game and where there is 
either more or less than the efficient amount of research. 
To investigate the question of incomplete pool1Dg. we first 
show that Q0 converges to Q� only in the clas:llcal caae when c -) O 
(and T � •) . 
(a) 
(b) 
Proposition J. .. 
z 
< ...a_ 
4bRz
• If 0 < c then as n-7 •var Q0 > var �-
a.s. 
If c -) O and n -7 •. then Q --70 n »· 
l'roof. (a) Frcm (5.14) and (5.16). 
z z 
P __ __ n_ a_T..._ _  var Q = and var Qp n -7 
a2Tc 
var 
n Cn + 1)2b2R CR + Tn) 
n2a2Tn (R + Tn) Q = • n b2R C2nR + Cn + 1)Tn>
2 
b2R CR + Tc) 
a2Tc (R + Tc) and var Q0 -7 2 2• b R CZR + Tc) 
Bence. 
a2T (3R + ZT ) 
l1m (var Q - var QP) = _ _ _,,c._ _ _  _,. _ _ > 0. 
n � • n n b2 (2R + Tc)z (R + Tc) 
(b) From (5.7) and (5.8) 
P n (n - l)aRT Qn - ci;; = Cn + l)b (R + Tn) (ZnR + (n + l)Tn) 
(Y - 90) 
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As c -7 O and n -7 •. T -7 • and Q - oP -7 o for any n n -n 
y = (y1····•Yn). 
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Q.E.D. 
a.s .. 
By (5.6) and (5.7). as n � •. �-� Q0• Since demand is 
linear. convergence ot Q: to Q8 implies convergence or equilibrium 
price in the pooled information game to the ef!'icient price. So the 
nonconvergence of Q0 to � implies that the equilibrim price in the 
oligopoly game does not converge to the ef"!'iciency price. This la.st 
conclusion f'ollows f'or any O < T0 < ...  including the special �e when 
c • k. and when the competitive research level is efficient. 
Palf'rey (1984) concludes that in large markets. even 11" no 
firm lcnows the true market demand curve and firms are not price-takers 
and do not use price as a sign.al to improve their iD!'ormation. the 
etf'icient price will prevail w1 th certainty. The above proposition 
points out that this is not true i!" the intormation is costly to 
acquire. 
6. Conclusion 
We conclude that when research acquisition is endogenously 
determined .. and when the research amount is positive l>ut !'1n1te,. the 
.symmetric equilibrium for an oligopoly is inef'ficient. This negative 
result includes the l1mit1ng case of a competitive market. For the 
competitive case .. the source of inefficiency is traced to a lack of 
information pooling as well as an inefficient total amount of 
research. 
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In terms ot the modeling, there are two main contributions of 
this paper. First, we model the research decieion u endogenous. Most 
other models of oligopolies take the research levels aa fixed. The 
second contribution is the proof' (Theorem 1) that existence of a 
unique linear Bayesian equilibrium to the second stage game depends 
only on a linear information structure. This aeema to be a U3e1"ul 
generalization of existing results, which depend on a normal 
information structure. 
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APPENDIX 
The proofs of Theorems 3 and .f follow t'rc:a the monotonicity of 
the best response correspondences. Monotonicity or the reaction 
functions for the continuous game follOW's from the tact that 
a2x1/at1atj < o. In the discrete game the correaponding condition is 
in terms of differences. We state the condition in a way which 
applies to both games. Monotonicity 1a then U3ed to establi� the 
existence of a unique symmetri.c quilibrium in each game. 
Let Mi :T0 �lR be i 
'• payof'f' t'unction for the game <M, T°>. 
where M = CM1 •••• ,Mn).. Write lt:T
n��Tn as the beat response 
correspandence f'or <M. T2>. We def'ine 4t as monotonic if'. t' ! s' 
whenever t > s, t' c fl'(t), and s' c Cli(s). Denote t_1 for 
(t1•···•t1-1•t1+1•···•tn ) and M1(t'1,t-1> = �Ct1•···•t'1•···•tn>• 
The condition corresponding to a2"1/at1atj < o is stated as 
follows. For each t"1 > t' 1• 
Mi{t"i.t-i) 
- Mi{t'i,t-i) is strictly decre88
1Dg in t_i. {A.1) 
Lemma !· If' T s;: E is compact and comex, <M, T°"> is a concave, 
continuous, and symmetric game, and each M1 satisfies condition (A.1), 
then 
(1) t> is symmetric, convex valued, upper hemi conUnuo03, and 
monotonic; 
(11) There is a unique oymmetric equilibrium for <M,T°>. 
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h:22l:' 
(i) The facts that 4> is symmetric, convex valued, and upper 
bemi continuous follow in standard :rasbion f'rom the hypcthesis that 
<M, T
n> is a continuous, concave, and symmetric game. To show 
monotonicity .. choose t > s and any t' a IS>(t) and any s' c �s), and 
suppose t• 1 > s •  1 for some 
1.. By condition CA.1) 
Mi(t'i. t-i) - Mi(s•i,t-i) < Mi(t'i,s-i) - Mi(s 'i,s-i). 
But since s 'i • <l>iCsil. "1Ct'i. s-il - "1C•'i,s-i) ! O. So 
Mi(t'i,t-i) < "1ls 'i. t-i). contradicting t'i • <l>i(t). Bence ti i si 
tor all 1, or t � s .. 
(ii) Let A • {t • TnltJ - t, all JI be the diagonal. and let 
F(t) = An <l>Ct). Note that tor each t c A, <l>i(t_il • <l>J(t_/ (all 
i.JJ. and there is at least one scalar "Jc • <l>i (t_1J tor all i. So 
s = (sk, ..... ,sk) c �(t} and F(t) is non empty for 8.Iij' t e A. Since$ is 
convex and upper hemi continuous, it rollows that F:A-7""7A is also 
convex and upper bem1 continuous.. Hence F has a t'ixed Point .. 
• • Let t be a f'ixed point of F and choose any· t c A vi th t > t 
Since t 
• 
• <l>(t 0>. by monotonicity t' ! t • tor all t• • F(t) .::: <l>Ctl. 
So t' < t and t t <l>Ctl. Similarly t < t • implies t t <l>(t). Theretore 
• 
t must be a unique symmetric equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
h:2.2f � Proposition 1,: 
aM1 
ati 
Ca> To apply Lmma 1. we set Mi(t) = lli(t). and calculate 
a2M 
__ i 
at2 i 
a2K1 and atiatJ 
2 
Mi(t) • lli(t) • c0 + � Di(t) - cti. 
where 
and 
co = CA - ae i
2 -
b(n + 1)2 
0 co· 
0 
Di(t) = 
i 
0 • 
R(2 - o1J2 (1 + �(__.::j__ll2 2 - 0 J 
Note that 
0 5 
<2 - o1J c1 + } __.::j__2 > • c2 - r. J <___L_ + } __.::j__> ':f - oJ i 2 - oJ .J1i2 - oJ 
where 5 
"1 - fr __.::j__ 2 - 0 • 1 J 
Rewriting, 
- 2 + (2 - oi)Ai. 
Di "" 
-
2' 
R(2(1 + Ail - oiAi) 
oi 
we find 
aD1 
= 
2(1 + �) - 61A1 + 2o1A1 
aoi RC2c1 + Ail - o1AiJ
3 
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2(1 + A1) + 61A1 ) 0 
R(2(1 + A1) - •iAi)3 
2 a D1 A1(2(1 + A1) - 6141) + 3A1C2(1 + A1) + 61A1> 
a•� 
• 
R(2(1 + Ai) - •iAi)4 
241(4(1 + A1) + &1A1) 
4 RC2(1 + Ai) - •iAi) 
Also note that 
Then 
� ___!! 
ati • Ct + R)2 i 
) o. 
a2s 
__ 1 . - ll.._ < 04 
3 at2 i (ti + R) 
� �-� 
ati • asi •ti • 
2(1 + A1) + &1A1 
3 <2<1 + Ai) - •iAi) 
a2D .:...::.! 
at2 i 
a2D �S J
2 
j1L� i + 
2 
�� 
••i at2 i 
a2D :::.:;. 
as2 i 
,2 
(ti + R)4 
aD1 2R 
- -- 3 a&i (ti + R) 
1 
(ti + R)
2 
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) 0 
fa2n 3D1l L----; . Cl - •i> - 2 a•i (ti + R)3 a&i 
35 
!.__,; 2A«4(1 + A1) + •iAi) (1 - •i> - 2(4(� + A1l - .i - •1Ai) r 2 2 2 2 ] (2(1 +Ai) - •iAi) 
2 
2A1(4 + 4A1 + 4A1&1 + 3A1&1) < 0 
(ti + R)3 (2(1 + Ai) - •iAi)
4 
Rewri te 
�- 2 + (2 + •i>"1 
(2 + (2 - •i)Ai)3 
(1 - •i>2 
ati 
Note 
� 
ask 
-
2 + 6k 
(2 - Sk)
2 
a2n1 - � � ati•k atiaAi •6k 
(1-S )2 
• 
-
-�i 
R2 
� �  at1atk .. at1a&k 
• ask 
atk 
k'.#1. so 
2 + 6k 
(2 - •k>
2 
R2 
8(1 - &1) + 2(4 - 6�)A1 
(2 + (2 - Si)"1)4 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
< 0 (A.4) 
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(1 - &i)
2(1 - &k)
2 
R3 
2 + 6k 
(2 - &k)
2 
8(1 - &i) + 2(4 - &�)Ai 
(2 + (2 - &i)Ai)
4 
(A.S) 
By (A.2) and (A.3) the continuous research game 1s concave, 
continuous and symmetric. Property (A.1) follows directly frca (A.S). 
Bence LEIDDl.a l applies and the continuous research game has a un1Q. ue 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
We next shov that there are no asymmetric equilibria.. A Na.sh 
equilibrium t .. Ct1 , ..... tn) must satisfy the Kuhn- Tuclcer conditions: 
aDi c b � 2 
ati 
= -;f: snd ti 1 o, 
� c2b 
or at < 2 and ti = o i a 
& 
(A.6) 
Nowlet S•l +)� =Ai+�. Then we can revri te 
(A.S) as 
':r j i 
2 
aD (2 + (2 + &i)(S - 2"'=""6)) 
.:.:1=---------'-
ati Ct + R)2 (2 - & )3s3 i i 
De:fine 
FC< ,S)= 
2(ti + R) + (3ti + 2R) 
2(ti + Rl) (S - ti + 2R 
(ti + 2R)
3s3 
[(3 2R)S - i:;C'!f 
+ R)] 't + 4 + 2R 
(x + 2R)3S3 
(A.7) 
< 0 So F(x,S) 
aDi =
�· i 
aF = __ .._ __ 
ax (< + 2R) 4g3 
[(3S - 4(x2 + 4RT + 2r» (x + 2R) (X + 2R)2 
-3((31: + 2R)S - u_<-: :!1>] 
L- " [6xS + -8x
2 + 4TR + srJ 
(x + 2R)4S3 
X + 2R 
= -
(x + 2RJ4s3
[(6S - in.,2 + n<3S + l)x + srl -c+2R j· 
Note that 
aF(ti,Sl 
ax 
= ___ J.._- [6t A + 4ti + 16tiR + srl 
(ti + 2R)
4S3 1 i 
ti + 2R 
< 0 
and 
aF(O.Sl = _1_ < O ax 4RS3 
• 
ar<x .s> So a1: < 0 tor 0 !.. 't i t1,and1 = 1, .... n. since 
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(A.8) 
(6S - 8).,,2 + 4R(3S + lh + sr > 0 if 6S - 8 2. 0 and it has only one 
Positive root, which occurs for 'C' > max(t1) if' 6S - 8 < O. i 
0 0 Now suppose (A.S) is satisfied by (t1, • • •  ,tn) for i - l, • • •  ,n, 
o o o o 
c2b o o c2b 
where some ti < tj 
• Then F(tj
.s ) =  > O and F(ti,S ) !. 2• so 
ao ao 
FCt�.sO) < FCtj.s0>. a contradiction 8ince F strictly declines in its 
:first argument. We conclude that there exists a unique Naab 
equilibrium and this equilibrium is symmetric. 
Cb) Let 
K(t.R) 
aD,I 
- __.. , -
• at11t1=tj=t 
Clan - llt2 + 2R(n + 2)t + 4JCJ 
C t+ 2R) ((n + l)t + 2RJ3 
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Direct calculation shows * < O and q > O. From CA. 6). t:or 
at 
any R., the condition which de termines the symmetric eq uilibrium is 
K(t,R) - � and t > o. or K(t.R) � � and t - o. 
a a 
2 
Since K is strictly decreasiog, t:or c < �. the equilibrium t 
4irb 
2 
strictly declines as c increases., whereas for c l � .. t .. O and 
4irb 
remains so as c increases. The convexity of t as a function of c 
simply follows f'rca the convexity ot K. 
(A.9) 
As b and ; play the same role as c in CA.9). it follows that 
a 
the equilibrium t is a cont1nuous. decrea.si.ng and convex function of b 
and a continuous. increasing runction of a. 
To 8how the equilibrium. t is a decreasing function of n. 
simply note that K is an increasing function of n for arry t 2 o. As n 
increases. equilibrium. t must decrease. unless of course equilibrium. t 
is already on the boundary t = o. in wh1ch case it rm.ain.s zero. 
Finally. to show that the equilibrium. 18 decreasing in R. a 
direct calculation shows � < O. The implicit function theorem then 
establishes that 
i1.!;. __ £K / M aR - aR at < 0 
Preliminary Observation .!:QI: Proposition _!: 
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Q.E.D. 
Before proving Proposition 
4 .. we observe the ract that the support ot 2.IIY' mi.xed strategy 
equilibrium in the discrete research game consists of at most two 
adjacen t  elements of S.. The argument is as follOW's. Note that M1 (t) 
is a strictly concave function of t1• For t restricted to be the set 
of n tuples of elements of S.. the expected pcryoft :function tor 1 is 
again a strictly concave function of t1 :since it 1s just a convex 
combination of M1ct1 .. t_1) over t_1• Therefore i's best response is 
either a single element ot S or indif'terence between two adjacent 
elements. 
h:22.( of Proposition ,!. First we define a game derived trcmt. the 
continuous research game. Let sn s; Jl ! be the restricted set of 
strategy n-tuples. For any t e lR �· def'1ne the meMure l.t :S
n-7JR as 
follOl<s. First. t:or i • N, define 4�:I-7:nl by 
ti - !i ir Si - � 
11� -� 
+ t ,�- i if' si-1i :ihs ) • t i + � �-
0 Otherwise 
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(A.10) 
Where � is the greatest element of S less than or equal to t1 
and � is the least element of S greater than �. Then set 
n i '-t (s) = n '"t (si). i=l 
Note that for any t,t• •JR+ With t > t•, '-t > '-t• (i.e., '-t' 
strictly stochastically dominates At>· That is. for all 
Sc Sn, At{s' c s0Js• ! s} ! l.t,{S' c s0Js• ! s), and strict 
inequality holds f'or sorrr.e s c s0• We now def'ine M•:lR!-? JR0 by 
M�(t) • [ '-t<•> Mi(s) • J Midl.t. (A.11) 
s c s0 
Clearly .. the derived game is equivalent to the discrete 
research game based on the preceeding observations. In the discrete 
research game, player i's dominant strategy is to choose two adjacent 
elements .s1 .. s� and a probability weight on them, say (1 -p) on s1 
+ and p on s1• while in the derived game, a choice of t1 means the 
+ + �-� choices or s1 and s1 are � and � and the choice of p is • 
1;- � 
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+ Also notice that ti = (1-p)� + p� is i's expected amount or research 
in the discrete re:search game. 
n • • It is easy to see that. f'or t c S .  M1(t) = M1Ct). and that M 
is a symmetric, continuous and concave game. 
(a) To show there exists a unique aymm.etric Nash equilibrium, 
it is suf'f'ici.ent to verit'y condition (A.1) f'or M•. in which caae the 
Lemma applies.. In the original game M, f'or any- t1', t1" c JR+ w:ith 
ti N > tj_ f. det'ine 
fi(t_i). "i_<ti",t-i) - "i_(ti',t-i) 
By (A.S), f':1.(t_1) is strictly monotone decreasing in t_1• Thus, f'or 
any l., l.', if' l. > l.', then 
Jr id'- < Jr id'-'. 
n-1 
By the stochastic dominance .. if' t_1• s_1 a JR+ aat13f'y t_1 > s_1• we 
have l.t > l.8 • So :tor t1',, t1" c s
. 
-i -i 
• • Mi(ti",t-i) - Mi(ti',t-i) • Jrid'-t -i 
< f'id'-s • "1 (ti"••-1> - "1 (ti• ,a
_il 
-i J • • 
(A. 12) 
+ 1 '+ 
For t"1 a S and t•1 a lR •set p,.. A.t,C� ). Then,. uaing 
(A.12) . we get 
M�(ti",t-i) - �(ti•,t-i) = (1-pl [ "i_(ti",t-i) - "i_(1i.t-i)] 
+ P[ Mi(ti",t-il - "i_C1�
.t-i)] 
< Cl-pl[ Mi(ti",s-i) - Mi(�,s-i) ] + P["i_(ti",s-i) - "i_l1�+,s_il] 
• • 
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= M (ti" ,s_i) - Mi (ti'' s_i) (A.13) 
In a similar fashion .. extend the result (A.13) to the case 
+ • ff when t"1 a lR • Thus we get that (A.12) holds tor all t1• t1 c lR + 
with t;> t�, and condition (A.1) 1.s verified. 
(b) Let t be the unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. 
� ;!_: Suppose £. < t < 1+ (i.e • •  the equilibrium is a mixed 
strategy). Then Mi<.t;_. t_i) = Mi(1 i' t_i). Det"ine Di(t) = Didlt 
• + • • J 
and write 
Thus, 
• + • MiC.t;_. t_i) - "i_(�. t_i) 
c[. 
+ • = b Di (.t;_, t_i) - Di (1i' 
• + • .£:Q. Di(.t;_,t-i) - Di(�,t-i) = 2· a 
t_i) l - c = o • 
• + • But Di C.t;_. t_i) - Di(�, t_i) is continuous and strictly decreasing in 
t.. so as c increases .. the equilibrium t decreases. 
£2M a_: Suppose t "' l. Ctbe equilibrium is a pure strategy). A 
necessary condition for the equilibrium to be a pure strategy is 
+ -Mi(�,1 -i> - Mi(�.1 -i> ! 0 ! MiC�.1 -i> - "i_(�,1 -i>' or 
+ 
ll -Di(�, 1 -i) - Di(�.1 -i) i 2 i Di(�, 1 -i) - Di(1i' 1 -i). a 
where .t.;: is the greatest el.ement or s less than �. 
As long as c remains in the interval given by CA.14) .. 
equilibrium t = 1 1s unchanged. Moreover as c decreases to 
cb( + ] "°"2 Di(�,1 -i) - Di(�,1 -i) a 
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(A.14) 
the equilibrium. t is the same as tbe equilibrium t which ia approached 
by c increasing to 
in case (1) • 
ll[ . + • l 2 Di C.t;_.1 -i) - Di (�,1 -i> a 
We conclude that the symmetric equilibrium t is a continuous, 
decreasing tunction of c. Since b and 1/a2 play the same role as c, 
the symmetric equilibrium t is a continuous, decreasing function of b .. 
and a continuous. increasing f'unction of a. Also .. t is a non 
+ increasing :function of H, since Di(ti,.t_i) - Di(1i • .t_i) is a 
decreasing function or R. 
(c) Let t be the unique symmetric equilibrium :for M .. and t • 
the unique symmetric equilibrium f'or M•. Let 4> and �· be the best 
response correspondences f'or M and M• .. respectively. Note that ci is a 
function. In light of the preliminary comments to the proof of 
. -Proposition 4 .. it suffices to show!. ! t !. t. By monotonicity .. 
. . -
<1>(1'.l l q>(t) • t l J;.. wh1ch 1mpl1es <I> (J;.) l J;.. Similarly <I> (t) � t. 
But then. it follows that the symmetric equ111br1um t • must :satisfy 
. - . J;. � t � t.  Otherwise. � t < J;. .  for example. we have 
• • • <I> (J;.) l J;. > t • Th1s 1s contrary to the monoton1c1ty of <I> • 
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Q.E.D 
In proving Propos1 ti on 7. we use the following useful fact. 
.!1l!fil'.!!l fiil' Let f (x) • [ d
0
xn be the Nth degree polynomial where 
n•O 
dn > O, d0 < O, and the sequence of coe.f'fi.cient3 only 8Wi.tcb once i.n 
s1gn (1. e. . d1 l O for 1 l k and � i O for 1 < k for sane O < k < HJ . 
Then f bas only one po3i. ti. ve root. 
g = dx 
h:22f. For any x > 0 
.(!- d nxn-1 
n4'i. n > k � d x
n-1 
n� n 
• k[f�xl _ :oJ !lrllll. since do < o > x 
Since dn > O and do < O, there i.s at least one positi.ve root. Denote 
the amalleot posit1ve root XO. Then f •  (XO) ) kf(xO) )  /xO a 0, so f 1s 
i.ncreasing and turns positive at x0• But since f' (x) > k.f(x) /x > o for 
x > O, once f turns positive it must always remain positive. Hence 
there is only one positive root. 
Q.E.D. 
lz:2.2r of Prono;lltion 1: 
2 
By (A.6) . (A.9) and (S.9) . 1t 1s easy to see that for 
2 2 
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...l!..z < 4bR c < ...l!..z• Tn '"' o. and Te > o. and for c 4 �· Tn "" Te = O tor 2bR 2bR 
any n l 1. so 1 t is sufficient to deal with the case O < 
W'hich the interior solution5 are obtained. 
Def1ne 
Gn(T) E n
2f C3n - 1>r2 + 2Rn(D + l)T + 4JCp2J 
(T + 2Rn) ( ( n  + l)T + 2RnJ3 
Ge(tl " ----1 
2(T + Rl2 
2 
...ll- 1n c 
� 4bR2 
Note that G0(T) • � is the condition for an interior equilibrium. 
a 
given by CA.6) and (A.9) where T • nt. total research.. Also note that 
G8(T) = � is the condition (5 .. 9) for the continuous approximi.z:ation 
a 
of the efficient level of research.. Both G0(T) and G8(T) are 
continuous and strictly decreasing in T with G0(•) "" GO(•) "" o. and 
Gn(O) • 1/4R2 and Ge(O) • 1/2R2• So for an 1ndustry of s1ze n and for 
2 
O ! c ! �· we can write the equilibrium research as tbe T 
4irb n 
sat1sfy1ng Gn(T ) = �2 • and the eff1c1ent level as the T sat1sfy1ng n e a 
Ge(Te) 
• �· Def1ne hn(T) a A(T)(Gn(T) - Ge(T) ) where 
a 
A(T) • 2(T + R) 2(T + 2Rn) ({n + l)T + 2Rn)3 
Note ACT) > O for all T 2 o and n 2 1, so the roots of bn(T) are the 
crossing po1nts of Gn(T) and Ge(T) . 
It is easy to verify that 
hn<T> = d4T
4 + d3t3 + d2r + �T + d0 
where 
d4 = sn
3 - sn2 - 3n - 1 
d3 K 2RnCn
3 + 2n - lln - 4) 
d2 = 2rn
2 cn + 1 > < 2n - 13> 
d1 = 4R
3n3 Cn + 7) 
d0 = -sR
4n4 
For 
n = 1 :  d4.d3 .di.d1 .d0 < o 
n = 2: d4 > o: d3 .d2 .di .do < o 
3 � n � 6: d4. d3 > o: di· d1,d0 < o 
n l 7: d4. d3 . d2 > o: � .d0 < o 
From the useful fact we conclude that for each n i 2. hn(T) 
has only one po:sitive root and G0(T) and Ge (T) cross just once. 
Denote the po:lltive root of hn(T) as T: and define 
2 2 
k = "'- Ge(T•) = "'- Gn(T•) n b n b n 
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Since Gn(O) = 1/4r and Ge(O) = 1/2R2 the result follows for 
n l 2 .  
47 
When n = 1 (tbe monoPoly case) it can be verified that 
1 d4 .d3 . d2 .d1 .d0 < o. illlplying no positive root to h (T) . Since 
G1 CO) = 1/4r. the equilibrilllD research for a monopoly 18 always less 
than the ei'ficiency level . 
Q.E.D. 
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